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ABSTRACT

An archival study of 100 files of dissolution of marriage
granted between January 1983 and December 1988 in three

Southern California county courthouses explored factors

affecting the likelihood of paternal custodial challenges in
divorce cases.

Based on a review of the literature of

domestic violence that details battering, men's needs for
control and domination, it was hypothesized that batterers
would be more likely to institute and win custodial

challehgeSf be in arrears in suppbrt payments, and fight for
male children who are of schobl-age than they would be to

fight for female children or preschool age children of
either sex.

It was further hypothesized that domestically

violent men earning a higher income would be more likely to
persist in custodial disputes by initiating court
appearances as a way to continue the control and harassment

of their wives, whereas domestically violent men with a

lower income would continue attempting to physically abuse
their wives after separation.

Data gathered from

dissolution files included person filing for divorce,
history of restraining orders, custody requested and

awarded, and type of visitation granted.

Amount of support,

arrearages, length of time dispute lasted, and demographic
data was also recorded.

Ill

The results that emerged indicated issues of control
such that violent fathers were more likely to fight for

custody of male children, be in arrears in support payments,
and persist in initiating court appearances when earning a
higher income than were nonviolent fathers.

Violent fathers

were also found to be as likely as nonviolent fathers to win
custody of their children.
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Prevalence of Domestic Violence in the United States

The existence of violence against women was ignored by
social scientists until 1971.

At this time, journal

articles and conferences regarding domestic violence began

to emerge (Gelles, 1974; O'Brien, 1971; pteinmetz! & Straus,
1974).

Due to the efforts of grassroots activists and

scholars, battering is now recognized as an extensive social
problem (Tierney, 1982).

The prevalence of domestic

violence in our society has been established by several
studies.

Walker (1979) estimated that 50% of all married

women in the United States were or would be battered in

marriage.

Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz (1980) estimated a

domestic violence rate of 50 to 60% based on a 29% reported
rate.

Levinger (1966) looked at sources of marital

dissatisfaction among applications for divorce and found a
50% domestic violence incidence rate.

The National Crime

Survey of 1976 found that one-fourth of all assaults against
women who had ever been married are committed by their
husbands or ex-husbands (Gacquin, 1978) .
Cvcle of Violence

When conducting research in areas involving domestic

violence, it is important to look at the cycle of violence

in order to understand the dynamics involved in a battering
relationship.

Langen & Innes (1986) reported that 32% of

been abused during an average six-month

period following the initial abusive incident.

These repeat

victims accounted for 57% of detected incidents of domestic

violence over a four-year period.

Bern (1982) tracked abuse

from a single violent incident to a cyclical pattern between
partners.

Walker (1979, 1989) describes the cycle of

violence as a tension-building phase, followed by the acute
battering incident> t

calm period afterward.

Deschner (1984) describes the cycle of violence as

having seven stages;

mutual dependence, the noxious event,

coercions exchanged, the "last straw" decision, primitive
rage, reinforcement for battering when the victim is
silenced, and repentance.
Mack (1989) emphasizes the systematic nature of the
feedback loop, which leads to the "last straw" decision and

reinforcement for battering when the victim is silenced.
Mack adds two more stages:

feelings of rejection and

abandonment on the part of the abuser, which fuel the anger,
and fear in the abused partner following the violent
episode.

Generally, cycles are completed once or twice a year

initially.

Gradually, the cycles become more frequent until

they occur within a period of a few weeks.
Incidence of Child Abuse bv Wife Batterers

When investigating the area of domestic violence, an

apparent question with regard to the children of these

relationships arises.

Specifically, one asks if the

violence is isolated to the husband-wife dyad or if it
consequently diffuses to the Children.

Studies indicate

that men who batter their wives tend to abuse their children

physically, sexually, and psychologically (Straus & Gelles,
1990; Pagelow, 1982; Gaylord, 1975).

Because data on child

abuse are based on official reports which are filed
differently in each state, they do not always indicate

severity and kind of abuse involved.

Also, they do not

always indicate the abuser's sex or define abuse in

psychologically complex ways.

Because of this, true

statistics on child abuse are not available.

The latest

national survey of the incidence of reported child abuse and

neglect conducted by the National Center on Child abuse and
Neglect found that there were 16.3 cases of maltreatment per
1,000 children in the population in 1986 (National Center on
Child Abuse and Neglect, 1988).
Studies on paternal child abuse are also difficult to

find.

Chase (1975) found that a mother and stepmother was

the abuser in 50% of the incidents and the father and

stepfather in about 40% of the incidents.

Others were

caretakers, siblings, or unrelated perpetrators.

However,

she noted fathers had a higher involvement rate than
mothers.

Two-thirds of the incidents in the homes where

fathers or stepfathers were present were committed by the
father or stepfather, while in homes with mothers or

stepmothers, the mothers and stepmothers were perpetrators

in less than half of the incidents that took place.
Additional studies have investigated the incidence of

woman batterers abusing their children.

Gaylord (1975)

conducted a pteliminary survey of 100 cases of
wifebattering.

He found that 54% of the husbands in his

study beat both their children and their wives.

Pagelow (1982) studied 306 battered mothers between

1977 and 1980.

She found that 76% of these mothers reported

that their children were victims of paternal violence, onehalf of them beaten along with their mothers and one-half of
them separately.
Roy (1977) conducted a study of 150 battered women.
She found that 45% of the assaults on the women were

accompanied by similar physical assaults on at least one

child in the home.

The remaining 55% were situations in

which the children were not assaulted, but were witnesses to
the attacks on their mothers.

She also found that 95% of

the mothers did not report their husbands to authorities for

child abuse for fear of reprisals and counter charges by the
husbands against the wives.

Walker (1979) studied the effects of battering on women
through interviews with battered women.

She found that one

third of the men who battered their wives also abused their
children.

a national survey of 3,520 families conducted in
1985, Straus & Gelles (1990) found that in families where

the husband had hit his wife during the year, the incidence
of child abuse was 150% greater than in other families.

They also found that husbands who were verbally aggressive

to their spouses had a significantly higher child abuse rate
as compared to husbands that were not.

In addition, they

found that fathers who had been hit at age 13 by their own

fathers exhibited a significantly higher rate of child abuse
than those fathers who had not.

Profile of the Batterer

In order to understand the forces at work and the

underlying causes of domestic violence, it is necessary to
consider the profile of the batterer.

addressed this issue.

Several studies have

Elbow (1977) had found that the

abusive male tends to project blame for mental strife onto
his wife, experiences her as an extension of his mother or

some significant other, and demands that she meet his rigid
expectations of marriage.

He is incapable of intimacy,

although he can offer warmth, protection, and security to
his wife.

Elbow also noted that often the abuser witnessed

his father assaulting his mother as a child.
Straus (1978), in a study of over 2000 adults found the

higher the stress score, the higher the rate of assault
between husband and wife, and that family violence was also
related to the husband's dominance.

He found that men who

assault their wives believe that physical punishment of

children and slapping of a spouse are appropriate behavior.
It was concluded that men who believe that husbands should

be the dominant person in a marriage, and esj)ecially if they
had actually achieved such a power position, had assault
rates from one and one-half to three times higher than men
without these values who were under stress.

Frieze (1979) reported similar findings from
interviewing battered women as compared to nonbattered
women.

She concluded that violent marriages are

characterized by high husband dominance and the use by
husbands of coercive power.

Results of an analysis conducted by Straus and Gelles
(1990) on data gathered from Straus's 1975 National Family

Violence Survey help to explain the etiolbgical yariabresbf
child abuse and wife beating.

Results showed that the more

physical punishment was experienced by the husbahds, the
higher was the rate of violence against wives.

Moreover,

this applied to infrequent as well as frequent violent
attacks, and also ordinary violence that is so frequent in
marriages.

A number of other studies have attempted to determine
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specific characteristics which are descriptive of spouse
abusers.

The various research has found that low self-

esteem (Cantoni, 1981); lack of self-control (Cantoni,

1981); blaming others for one's actions (Walker, 1979);

social isolation (Cantoni, 1981); rigidity (Elbow, 1982);
and distress (Cantoni, 1981; Ponzeti, Gate, & Koval, 1981;
r

Walker, 1979) are all characteristics of batterers.
Social and Historical Theorv of Domestic Violence

Other social scientists assert that it is important to
study the social and historical relationships within the

family to reveal the meaning and purpose behind battering.
They stress the importance of men choosing women and
children as targets of battering.

The fact that men do this

only in their homes to regain what they believe is their

rightful control of the situation is also of significance.
According to this view, the male-dominated culture in which

violence has been institutionalized perpetuate the incidence
of battering (Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Rowbotham, 1973;
Schechter, 1982; Weitzman, 1976).

Yllo and Straus (1984) looked at the relationship

between the rates of wife beating in American states and the

degree to which each state is characterized by a patriarchal
social structure and patriarchal family norms.

Their

results indicated a curvilinear relationship between
patriarchal structure and the rate of wife beating such that

wife beating was found to be highest in those states where

structural inequality in ecoriGmic, educatiohai> political,
and legal inistitutions was greatest.

As the status of woitien

imprdvedv violence declined to a point, such that in the
states where women's status was the highest, the rate of

wife beating was also very high.

A linear association

between patriarchal family norms and wife beating was also
found such that states with male-dominant norms had twice as

much wife beating as states with more egalitarian norms.
Additionally, they found an interaction between structural

and normative factors in their impact on rates of wife
beating.

Wife beating was found most common in a context

where women's status in economics, educational, legal, and
political institutions was relatively high but where
prevailing norms favored their subordination within

marriage.
Rewards of Intimate Violence

Family members hit one another because they can with
few negative consequences.

In addition, there are rewards

for exhibiting violent behavior.
immediate.

The rewards are often

The husband hits the wife because the effects

are immediate, powerful, he feels in control, and his wife

often responds by altering her behavior in a way that

reinforces him.

Using violence can be a rewarding method of

working off anger or frustration for a person seeking

immediate gratification.
Power, control, and self-aggrandizement are additional

rewards of family violence.

Goode (1971) has proposed that

force or its threat is an underlying element in all social
systems, because all social systems are, to a certain

extent, power systems.

Force or violence is proposed to be

one of four major sets of resources by which people can
induce others to obtain their desired outcomes.

sets of resources include;

The four

economic factors (giving or

withholding economic rewards or services); prestige or
respect; likability, attractiveness, friendship, or love;
and, force and its threat.

One can exert influence on

people using any of these systems.

All of these factors are

at work within the family, and all are used because they can
effectively control the behavior of loved ones.
The consequences of intimate violence further increase

the rewards for an individual whose goal is to control
another.

Chronic violence tends to wear victims to a

condition in which they will do anything to appease their
batterers and avoid violence.

For the individual exerting

control, the reward is not only control or power, but selfesteem as well.

Maintaining control of a situation

increases one's self-esteem and sense of self-worth,

especially one whose self-esteem may have been damaged by
experiences outside of the home.

An additional reward for hitting is revenge.

One who

feels their self-worth has been attacked or threatened may
seek revenge as when conflict escalates and each intimate

throws out the other's vulnerabilities, violence may be used
as a defense.

Social control probably serves to deter violence in

most situations.

into abuse.

Minor hitting usually does not escalate

When abuse does occur, it is usually due to any

of several factors, including low social control due to high
stress, frustration, social isolation, and beliefs that

hitting is an appropriate method to control wives and
children.

Consequences to Women Upon Leaving the Abusive Relationship

In conjunction with the historical and social
explanation for battering, a modest amount of research has

dealt with the consequences suffered by women after leaving
an abusive spouse.

Chesler (1986) asserts that mothers have

been custodially challenged when they accused their husbands
of child neglect, child abuse, and incest.

Accusations of

wife battering, demands for alimony, child support, or the

marital home have also prompted custodial challenges by
fathers against mothers.

Chesler reviewed studies of

American custody battles throughout the 1970's and 1980•s.

She found that they tend to confirm that fathers custodially
challenged mothers, that many fathers won judicial custody.

arranged paternal custody privately, or won "kidnapping"
custody of their children.

Weitzman and Dixori (1981) found that 63% of the fathers

in Los Angeles who fought for custody succeeded in 1977*
They revealed that although 90% of all mothers seeking
divorce were granted custody, with an increase in divorce,
the actual number of fathers receiving custody increased

Additional studies have found other negative effects on
women and children as a result of divorce.

Weitzman and

Dixon (1981) found that divorce forces mothers and children
into poverty.

Most fathers don't pay child support, and

most courts won't order adequate or enforceable amounts of

child support from fathers.
Chesler (1986) conducted an extensive study of 60

mothers being custodially challenged from 1960-1981 by
taping interviews, reading and analyzing each mother's trial
manuscript, legal deposition, psychiatric report, and
relevant private correspondence.

She also interviewed

custodially embattled, custodial, and noncustodial fathers

which she used to confirm her findings of the maternal
interviews.

Five of these men had been married to five of

the maternal interviewees and 30 were fathers' rights
activists.

Although 87% of the maternal interviewees had

never worked full time or at careers once they married, 77%

of the judicially successful and 69% of the privately
successful fathers refused to pay any kind of child support

prior to obtaining custody^

She also found that 62% of the

custodial fathers physically abused their wives, 57% engaged
in anti-mother brainwashing campaigns, 37% kidnapped their
children, and 3% were incestuous fathers.

All of the mothers in Chesler's study had
psychologically bonded with their children and were their
primary caregivers.

Of the custodial fathers, 87% did no

housework or primary child care, and only 12% helped out
occasionally by babysitting.
In spite of the above circumstances, Chesler found that

70% of the judges ordered children into custody of the
fathers, and 70% of the private arrangements also resulted

in paternal custody.

Within two years, 82% of all custody

battles resulted in paternal custody.

The 30% of mothers

who initially won custody were married to less physically
abusive husbands.

The fathers in her study fought for custody for a
minimum of eight reasons in addition to loving their
children.

Of these reasons, 67% of the fathers had an

economic motive such as maintaining the marital home for
themselves, and some wanted to escape paying child and

spousal support.

Nearly two-thirds of the fathers fought

for custody of children as a way to punish their wives.

They believed wifely disobedience (such as returning to
school or work) or obtaining a divorce was a form of

maternal unfitness.

Approximately 23% believed they were

superior parents and needed their children to be their

"obedient inferiors, as domestic servants, and personal-

genetic allies" (Chesler, 1986, p. 78).

Also, 25% fought

for custody because they or their second wives were
infertile.

Purpose of the Present Study
Presently no current data can be located on the number

of domestically violent men obtaining custody in the general
population.

There is also a lack of studies available on

the relationship between men who are domestically violent
custodially challenging mothers and winning custody of their

chiidren.

Therefore, the present study is intended to

determine if such a pattern exists.
A review of the literature indicates that the male who

is domestically violent tends to believe that he should be

the dominant figure in the family and that his wife and

children are his property.

He also has a tendency to be

rigid and to blame others for his actions.

For these

reasons, it is hypothesized that men who are domestically
violent are more likely fo fight for custody of their
children than those who are not.

Also, because studies have

found an increasing tendency for fathers who seek custody of
13

their children to reGeive custody/ it is hypothesized that

domestically vidlent fathers who fight for ctistpdy are more
likely to win custody of their qhildren due to their
persistence to regain control.
It could be asked if there are certain conditions in

which it is more favorable for fathers to fight for custody.
Chesler (1986) found that the average age of all children

when a battle began was nine years.

The average age of the

youngest child when a battle began was six years.

She

concluded that fathers fought for children who had been

toilet-trained, verbal, of school age, and male.
Because there is little information available on the

ages or sex of children involved in custody battles between

their parents, this study will attempt to determine the
average youngest age and sex of children in such custody

Chesler (1986) also found that the majority of fathers
who fought for custody did so because they did not want to

give financial support to their ex-wives.

She also

determined that the majority of fathers who were successful

in obtaining custody of their children failed to pay any

child or spousal support prior to winning custody.

The

present study will attempt to see if there is a tendency for
fathers that are domestically violent to be in arrears more
so than fathers that are not domestically violent.

;
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Luepnitz (1982) conducted a study of joint custody.
She found that sole and joint custodial fathers fought long,

hard, and bitterly to win custody and had higher incomes,
more support systems, and less of a problem maintaining

authority with children than did sole or joint custodial
mothers.

'

/

Chesler (1986) also found that money played an
important role in paternal custodial success.

Economic

power allowed fathers to maintain persistence in their legal

battles for an extensive period of time without suffering
any economic hardships.

The fathers in her study earned

five times as much income as the mothers earned.

In

contrast, paternal withholding of support eventually
devastated the maternal-child unit, economically and

psychologically.

The custodial battles lasted an average of

three years, 62% of which included fathers who had been

domestically violent.

While the Chesler data is impressive, her sample is
relatively small and the selection process was not random.
The present study will be conducted using files on
dissolution of marriage from courthouse records.

In this

way, data gathered will tend to be more objective and basic

statistics on incidence in the general population can also
be determined.

15

Hypotheses

The present study was conducted to view the overall
differences between faxailies involved in dissolution of

marriage where violence had occurred versus those in which

violence had not occurred.

Specifically, there were eight

hypotheses.

1.

It was hypothesized that fathers who are

domestically violent would be more likely to fight for
custody of their children than fathers who are not

domestically violent.
2.

It was hypothesized that fathers who are

domestically violent would be more likely to win custody of
their children than fathers who are not domestically violent
when custody is contested.

3.

It was hypothesized that the older the age of the

youngest child at the time of separation, the more likely it
would be for fathers to fight for custody of their children.
4.

It was hypothesized that violent fathers would be

more likely to fight for custody of male children than

female children as compared to nonviolent fathers.
5.

It was hypothesized that violent fathers would be

more likely to be granted custody of male children than
female children as compared to nonviolent fathers.
6.

It was hypothesized that fathers who are

domestically violent would be more likely to be in arrears

16

in support payments than fathers who are not domestically
violent.

7.

It was hypothesized that men who are domestically

violent earning a higher income, will be more likely to
persist in initiating court appearances.

8.

It was hypothesized that domestically violent men,

earning a lower income, would be more likely to continue to

harass their wives in more physically abusive ways after
separation.

17

METHOD

File Selection

Dissolution files were the data base for the study.
Sample files were randomly chosen from courthouse records of

dissolution of marriage.

Three courthouses were sampled,

one from each of three Southern California counties;

45

files from Pomona Superior Court in Los Angeles County, 33
files from Riverside Superior Court in Riverside County, and
22 files from San Bernardino Superior Court in San

Bernardino County.

Files beginning with January 1983

through December 1988 were selected and coded.

Files with

no minor children were eliminated from consideration.

A

total sample of 100 files from all three courthouses were
selected.

Data Collection

The researcher conducted the coding.
was recorded on a card (see Figure 1).

used for each file.

Data on each file

One data card was

Each data card requested identical

information from each file.

This information was recorded

when available in the file.

Information requested on the data card included the

courthouse the sample was taken from, date proceedings

began, file number, the name and gender of the judge, and
person initiating the dissolution of marriage.

The issuance

of a restraining order is usually the only evidence of
18

Figure 1.

Data Card.

File #

:

Date of Separation

Length of Marriage

Courthouse

Judge

(M) (F)

Date proceedings began

Who Petitioned

Children:

Mother Request Custody

Ages of F Children

Legal:

# of F

Sole

Joint

Ages of M Children

Physical: Sole;

Joint

Age of Mother
Age of Father

Father Request Custody

Legal:

Sole

Joint

Physical: Sole

Joint

Mother employed?
Occupation
Income _____

Father employed?
Occupation ^
Income ■

Custody Awarded:

Legal:

Sole

Joint

(Mother, Father)

Physical: Sole

Joint

(Mother, Father)

# of additional court proceedings
Who initiated proceedings
Purpose

.

.

Result

Type of visitation awarded to noncustodial parent

Amount of Child Support Ordered

Amount of Spousal Support Ordered
Amount in arrears

Length of time dispute lasted

Request for TRO?

19

# of M

Who requested TRO?
TRO granted?

:

Why was TRO granted _
History of violende?

Corroborating Evidence?

# of abusive incidents prior to separation
# of abusive incidents after separation

20

^

allegations of domestic violence in a family law file.

A

request for a restraining order is usually accompanied by a
declaration filed by the party requesting such an order.

In

addition, police reports and incident reports are referred
to in the declarations for further proof of need for

protection.

Therefore, information on whether a restraining

order was requested, who requested it, who it was granted
to, and why it was requested was recorded.

Also noted was

who requested and who was awarded custody, along with the
amount and type of visitation ordered to the noncustodial

parent.

Information on the amount of child and spousal

support, whether support was in arrears, and if so, the

amount in arrears was collected.

The total length of time

the dispute lasted, number of abusive incidents prior to
separation (if listed), number of abusive incidents after

separation, additional court proceedings that occurred, and
the person initiating the court proceedings, as well as the
nature of the proceeding was also recorded.

Basic demographic data recorded consisted of the ages
of each woman, man, and child at the time dissolution began;

number of children; sex of each child; employment status,
type of employment, and income of each woman and man, if

applicable; length of marriage, and, date of separation.
Procedure

Three courthouses were sampled:

Pomona in Los Angeles

County, Riverside in Riverside County, and San Bernardino in
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San Bernardino County.

A total of 100 files on dissolution

of marriage from the courthouses were sampled.

Files in

Oach courthouse were kept in numerical order with numbers

assigned according to the time in which a couple filed for

dissolution.

Files were chosen at random using a computer

generated random numbers table, starting with the month of

January 1983 through December 1988 by going through

dissolution of marriage files and extracting only those in
which children were involved.

The average incidence rate

per year of dissolution cases filed in each courthouse was

determined.

Files were then chosen randomly such that an

equal number of files were utilized each year totaling 100
for the entire six year period that was studied.

If a file

was extracted in which there were no minor children

involved, the file was not used.

Another file number was

randomly selected for that year.

All information requested

on the data cards was then recorded for each file, if
available.
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RESULTS

All analyses were performed using SPSSPC 4.0.

The

basic descriptive statistics on all of the variables are

presented by father type in Table 1.

Table 2 presents the

means and standard deviations of the demographic variables
of the sample.
Paternal Custodial Disputes

The Chi-square analysis, which appears in Table 3, was
run on the data to test the hypothesis that fathers that are

domestically violent would be more likely to fight for
custody of their children than fathers that are not

domestically violent.

Results yielded a significant

relationship between violent fathers and paternal custodial

disputes,

(1) = 16.22, p = .00005.

As may be seen from

Table 3, violent fathers were significantly more likely to
fight for custody than were nonviolent fathers.
Paternal Custodial Decisions

To test the hypothesis that fathers who are

domestically violent would be more likely to win custody of
their children than fathers who are not domestically
violent, a Chi-square analysis, which appears in Table 4,
was performed.

Results did not yield a significant

relationship between violent fathers and paternal custodial

decisions, x^ (1) = .123, p. = .726.

As may be seen from

Table 4, 16 violent fathers were granted custody of their

children, while 15 nonviolent fathers were awarded
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custody.

Table 1

Description of Sample by Father Type

Non-

Domestically

Number of Fathers

Domestically

Violent

Violent

Fathers

Fathers

49

51

37

18

16

15

26

10

21

2

in Disputes

40

16

Number of Daughters
Involved in Disputes

30

21

Number of Sons in Paternal
Custodial Awards

19

13

15

17

Number of Fathers

Contesting Custody
Number of Fathers

Granted Custody
Number of Fathers in
Arrears

Number of Fathers in

Arrears Contesting Custody
Number of Sons Involved

Number of Daughters in
Paternal Custodial Awards
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Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations of Demographic Variables

N

X

SD

Father's Education (years)

100

12.9

1.7

Mother's Education (years)

100

12.2

1.98

Father's Gross Monthly
Income

100

2,049.92

1,341.58

Mother's Gross Monthly
Income

100

1,020.34

678.48

Age of Youngest Child in
Custody Disputes

55

5.67

4.22

Age of Youngest Child Not
in Custody Disputes

45

6.11

4.45

Court Appearances Initiated
by DV Fathers

49

1.96

49

.96

Father's Age

100

33.61

6.14

Mother's Age

100

30.72

6.01

1.87

Violent Incidents After

Separation

DV = domestically violent
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1.7

Table 3

Chi-sauare Analysis of the Number of Violent vs,
Nonviolent Fathers Fiahtina for Custody

Fathers

Violent
Fathers

Father

Don •t

Row

Fight

Fight

Total

37

27.0
10.1

Nonviolent
Fathers

Column
Total

12

49

22.1

49.0%

-10.1

18

33

51

28.1

23.0

51.0%

-10.1

10.1

55

45

55.0%

Count

Expected Value
Residual

X2 (1) =16.22, E = .00005.

26

45.0%

100

100.0%

Table 4

Chi-sauare Analysis of the Number of Violent vs.
Nonviolent Fathers Granted Custody

Fathers

Fathers

Granted

Not Granted

Custody

Custody

Violent

16

Fathers

15.2
.8

Nonviolent
Fathers

Column
Total

Total

33

49

33.8

49.0%

-.8

15

36

51

15.2

33.8

51.0%

-.8

.8

31

69

31.0%

69.0%

Count

Expected Value
Residual

(1) = .12274,

Row

.72608.
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100

100.0%

Children's Aae as a Variable

A t test was performed on the data to test the

hypothesis that the older the youngest child is at the time
of the separation, the more likely the father would be to

fight for custodyi

The age of the youngest children whose

fathers fought for custody (M =5.67) was not found to be

significantly higher than the ages of the youngest children
whose fathers did not fight for custody (M= 6.11),
t(94) = -.50, p = 617.

Sex of the Children in Custodial Disputes
A Chi-sguare analysis was run on the data to test the

hypothesis that violent fathers would be more likely to
fight for custody of male children than female children as

compared to nonviolent fathers when custody was contested.
Results which appear in Table 5 indicated a significant
relationship between the likelihood of violent fathers

fighting for custody of male children as compared to

nonviolent fathers,

(1) = 21.243, p = .OOOO.

As may be

seen from Table 5, violent fathers were more likely to fight
for custody of male children than were nonviolent fathers.

As Table 6 indicates, violent fathers were also more likely
than nonviolent fathers to fight for custody of female
children, x2 (1) =5,439^

_0T97.

Sex of Children in custodial Decisions

To test the hypothesis that violent fathers would be
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Chi-square Analysis of the Number of Sons Involved in
Paternal Custodial Disputes:

Violent vs. Nonviolent Fathers

For

40

Violent
Fathers

28.3

2.2

27.7

Fathers

-2 .::2::;

Count

Total
■ 9

49

20.7

50.5%

■ .: _.-:32 V

Violent

Column

Row

-2.6

16

20.3

56

Total

Don't Fight
For

.

Expected Value
Standard Residua1

= 21.243, p = .0000

29

:>4,9»;5%

2.6
41

57.7%

4S

42.3%

97

100.0%

Table 6

Chi-sauare Analysis of the Number of Daughters Involved

Fathers

Fight
For

Don't Fight

Row

Custody

For Custody

Total

Domestically

30

12

42

Violent

24.1

17.9

47.2%

Fathers

1.2

-1.4

Nondomestically
Violent
Fathers

-

21

26

47

26.9

20.1

52.8%

-1.1

1.3

Column

51

Total

38

57.3%

Count

Expected

Value

Standard Residual

(1) = 5.439 E =

.0197.

30

42.7%

89

100.0%

more likely to be granted custody of male children as
'

i

■

compared to nonviolent fathers.when custody was contested, a

Chi-square analysis was performed.

Results which appear in

Table 7 did not yield a significant relationship between the
likelihood of violent fathers being granted custody of male
children as compared to nonviolent fathers,
P = .3132.

(i) = 1.017,

As may be seen from Table 7, violent fathers

were not granted custody of male children significantly more
than nonviolent fathers.

As Table 8 indicates, violent

fathers were just as likely as nonviolent fathers to be
granted custody of daughters, x^ (1) = .0000, p = 1.000.
Support in Arrears

A Chi-square analysis, which appears in Table 9, was
run on the data to test the hypothesis that fathers that are

domestically violent would be more likely to be in arrears

in support payments than fathers that are not domestically
violent.

Results yielded a significant relationship between

violent fathers being in arrears in support payments,
X^ (1) = 12.14, p = .00049.

As may be seen from Table 7,

violent fathers were significantly more likely to be in
arrears in support payments than nonviolent fathers.
Income as a Variable

A correlation matrix was run including the variables of
male's income, female's income, male's persistence, female's
persistence, and number of violent episodes since
31
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Chi-sauare Analysis of the Number of Sons Involved in
Paternal Custodial Decisions:

Violent vs. Nonviolent

Fathers

Fathers

Fathers Not

Winning
Custody

Winning
Custody

-' ■ ■ 'is")
Violent
Fathers

16.2

■ ■■v" ;V-.7

Nondomestically

■■

Violent

15.8

Fathers

13
-

-.7 ;

Column
Total

■;

Count

Standard Residual

X2

30

49

50.5%

5;:'\
35

48

32.2

49.5%

;yK -5.
67.0%

Expected Value

(1) = 1.017, E = .3132

32

Total

32.8

65

32

33.0%

Row

97

100.0%

:'Table-,,8- ,

■

•

Chi-sauare Analysis of the Number of Daughters Involved
in Paternal Custodial Decisions:

Violent vs. Nonviolent

Fathers

Fathfers

Fathers Not

Winning

Winning

Custody

Domestically
Violent

Row

Total

15

27

42

15.1

26.9

47.2%

Fathers

17

30

47

Violent

16.9

30;1

52.8%

Fathers

" •0

-•0

:

Column
Total

i2
36.0%

Count

Expected Value
Standard Residual

(1) = .0000, E = 1.000.

33

: 57 .

89

64.0%

100.0%

Table 9

Chi-sauare Analysis of the Number of Fathers in Arrears on
Support Payments;

Violent vs. Nonviolent Fathers

Arrears

Arrears

No

Yes

Row

Total

Violent

26

23

49

Fathers

17.6 ■

'SI. 4

49.0%

8.4

8.4

Nonyiblent

41^

10 ■

Fathers

32.6

18.4

.■ ■.-8v4;
Column

/

■

8.4
64

36

36.0?

Total

64.0?

Count

Expected Value
Residual

= 12.13847, p = .00049.
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51

51.0%

100

100.0%

separation.

A signifiGant correlation was found between

male's persistence and male's income. Table 10 displays the
correlation matrix, along with means and standard deviations
for each of the variables.

A second correlation matrix was run including the
variables of male's income, female's income, whether the

male was domestically violent, and male's persistence in
court.

Table 11 displays the correlations between the

variables as well as the means and standard deviations for
each.



A stepwise regression was employed, entering domestic

violence on the first step with male's persistence as the
dependent variable.

with the multiple R,

Table 12 presents the summary table

, adjusted R^, F values, significant

F values, standardized regression coefficients, (B), and

correlations.

On step one, R was significantly different

from zero, R = .51087, F (1,57) = 20.1298, p = .0000.

Whether the fathers were domestically violent was a
significant predictor of their persistence in court.

On step 2, male's income was entered, R was again found

to be significant, R = .5868, F (2,56) = 14.7039, p = .0000.

The male's income accounted for a significant additional,
independent amount of variance.

Thus, the results indicate

that being a domestically violent male and male's income
each predicted male's persistence in court.
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Table 10

Correlation Matrix of Male's Income. Female's Income. Male's Persistence in Court.
Female's Persistence in Court, and Number of Violent Incidents After Separation

Male's

Variables

Persistence

Male's

Female's

Female's

(DV)

Income

Income

Persistence

Violent

Episodes

Male's
Income

.362

Female's
Income

.054

-.232

.291

.264

.154

.107

.016

.020

Female's
OJ
a\

Persistence

Violent

Episodes
Mean

.116

1.939

2266.47

1013.98

2.224

1.875

1519.84

775.84

1.246

1.939

Standard

Deviation

1.784

DV - Dependent Variable

Table 11

Correlation Matrix of Domestic Violence. Male's Income.
Female's Income, and Male's Persistence

Variables
Domestic
Violence

Domestic
Violence

Male's

Female's

Male's

Income

Income

Persistence

1.000

Male's
Income

-.222

Female's
Income

-.188
.011

Male's

Persistence
Mean

-.511

.395

-.006

.510

2049.924

1020.342

1.100

.502

1341.557

678.480

1.617

Standard

Deviation

R2 = .26099

Adjusted
R

=

= .51087

37

24802

Table 12

Summary Table of Stepwise Regression With Domestic Violence and Male's Income on Male's
Persistence in Court

Multiple
Step

R

Adjusted
R2

Signif

R2

icant

Beta

Variable

In

Corre

lation

F
IN:

Domestic
.51087

.26099

.24802

20.1298

.0000

Violence

-.51087

-.511

.29610

.395

IN:

Male's
.58679

U)
00

.34432

.32091

14.70392

.0000

Income

A3 X 2 ANOVA was run to determine if a significant
two-way interaction existed between whether the father was

domestically violent and the male's income level.

was separated into three groups:

Income

low average ($0 - $1750),

high average ($1751 - $4000), and high income ($4001 and
above).

Although no significant two-way interaction was

found, F (1,64) = .001, E = .977, it is interesting to note
that every case (7 out of 7) of the high income ($4001 and

above) consisted of a domestically violent male fighting for
custody.
Violence as a Variable

A stepwise regression was run to test the hypothesis
that violent males earning a lower income would be more

likely to persist harassing their wives in physically
abusive ways after separation.

Male's income, female's

income, male's persistence and female's persistence were run
with number of violent incidents since separation as the
dependent variable.

No variables were allowed to be entered

due to .05 limits being reached.

Therefore, violent

episodes did not contribute a significant amount of

variance.

The hypothesis that violent males earning a lower

income would attempt to continue harassing their wives in
physically abusive ways was not supported.
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DISCUSSION

The present study was conducted to contribute to the

literature and provide data on the relationship between
paternal custody and domestic violence.

The literature

fails to reveal any basic descriptive statistics on this

topic.

Therefore, the present study will provide such data

for future reference and study.

The hypothesis that men who are domestically violent
would be more likely to fight for custody of their children
than those who are not domestically violent, was found to be

significant.

This supports Chesler's (1986) assertion that

violent, misogynous men may actually be more likely to

institute custody battles as a control issue.

This finding

also corresponds with the profile of the wife batterer as

needing to maintain dominance in the marital relationship
and his use of coercive power (Frieze, 1979; Straus, 1978;
Elbow, 1977).

The hypothesis that fathers who are domestically
violent would be more likely to win custody of their

children than fathers who are not domestically violent was
not supported.

Although the results did not yield

significance, it is important to consider the fact that 16
violent fathers and 15 nonviolent fathers were awarded

custody of their children.

It appears that having a history

of violent behavior does not greatly hinder a father's
chances of winning custody of his children.
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with regard

the older the aige of

the youngest child at the time of separation, the more

likely it would be for fathers to fight for custody, no
support was found.

This could be due to fathers having more

support systems available to them.

Greater economic power

may allow them to hire help to care for their children.

Also, it is possible that these fathers have established a
relationship with another woman who is available to help
care for the children.

The hypothesis that violent fathers would be more

likely to fight for custody of male children than they would
for female children as compared to nonviolent fathers was
found to be significant.

That custody is related to the

father's masculine power and control issues may be evident
in this finding.

The results tend to support the assertion

by Chesler (1986) that violent fathers contesting custody

maintain a gender preference such that they are more
strongly motivated to fight for male children than female
children.

The hypothesis that violent fathers would be more

likely to win custody of male children than they would
female children as compared to nonviolent fathers was not
supported.

In part, this may be due to the fact that the

current study included three different counties into the

data.

In each county, the court determines its own type of

family mediation.

The courts also differ in how strongly
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each judge considers recommendations made by family court
mediators.

Therefore, the criteria used in custodial

determinations may vary to a great degree.
The hypothesis that fathers who are domestically

violent would be more likely to be in arrears in support

payments than nonviolent fathers was found to be
significant.

This supports the findings by Chesler (1986)

in which she found that the majority of fathers (62% of
which were violent) fought for custody to avoid paying
support to their ex-wives and that they failed to pay child
or spousal support prior to winning custody.

This also

supports the profile of the batterer as needing to maintain
control and dominate his spouse.
The fact that violent fathers are more likely to be in

arrears in support payments also supports the contention by
Goode (1971) such that power, control, and self-esteem are

rewards of family violence.

Giving or withholding of

economic rewards or services is a method used to exert

influence.

It could also be considered a method in which

batterers seek to get revenge with the spouse for leaving.
Additionally, this may be a way in which the abusive male

hopes to force his spouse to return to the relationship,
perceives himself regaining control of the situation, and
subsequently regaining some sense of self-worth.

The failing to support children apparently did not

reduce the chances of violent fathers winning custody of
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their children.

In the present study, 21 of the 37 violent

fathers who fought for custody were in arrears in suppprt
payinents, whereas only two of the 18 nonviolent fathers who

fought for custody were in arrears in support payittents.
This clearly demonstrates that this is a control issue

restricted for the most part,; to abusive relationships.

As

indicated in the literature (Frieze, 1979; Straus, 1978;
Elbow, 1977), the abusive man maintains a need to dominate

and uses coercive power in order to do so.

The hypothesis that violent fathers that earn higher

incomes would be more likely to persist in initiating court
appearances was found to be significant. The violent male•s

income significantly predicted his persistence in initiating
court appearances.

This supports the results by Luepnitz

(1982) in which sole and joint custodial fathers fought
long, hard, and bitterly to win custody and had higher
incomes.

It also supports Chesler (1986) in which economic

power allowed fathers to maintain persistence in their legal
battles for an extensive period of time.

In the present

study, custodial disputes lasted a mean duration of 2.7

years with the mean gross monthly income of the males being
$2050 and the females mean gross monthly income being $1020.
The fact that battered women in the study had
substantially lower incomes than their husbands could be

related to control.

As indicated by the literature

(Chesler, 1986; Roy, 1977; Straus, 1978), men who abuse
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their wives tend to maintain traditipnal gender stereotypes.
Therefore, they would not be likely to tolerate their wives
competing with them in the bread winner role.

As a

consequence, it is highly probable that most battered women

earning minimal incomes find themselves at a significant
disadvantage in a court of law when opposed by husbands
whose incomes are substantially higher.
When considering the issue of the prevalence of

:

domestic violence in the general population, the current
study, although a sample consisting of married couples from
three Southern California Counties, resulted in a 49%

incidence rate (49 out of 100 cases involved domestic

violence)

The majority of these cases involving domestic

violence (41 cases) reported a history of violence

throughout the lifetime of the marriage.

This history of

violence was documented by declarations, police reports,

physicians* records, documentation of hospital emergency
room treatment, witnesses' declarations and depositions.

The 49% figure found in this study supports the 50%

estimates made by Walker (1979); Straus, Gelles, and

Steinmetz (1980); as well as the 50% reported rate of
Levenger (1965).

Although a small sample, this study did

not include any other type of cohabitating relationships.
Therefore, couples living together out of marriage were

excluded.

The entire population of women seeking temporary
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restraining orders for protection from an abusive boyfriend
were not considered in the results.

The results of the present study suggest that fathers

who have a history of violence, earning a substantial
income, continue to harass their ex-wives by involving them

in long-term custodial disputes due to their greater earning
power.

Because having a history of violent behavior does

not significantly decrease their chances of winning custody
of their children, these fathers are reinforced by the court
system for their persistence and they are successful, with
the help of the court system, in maintaining control of

their ex-wives and children to a great extent.
Battered women leave a violent relationship hoping to
break free of the control and domination of their batterers,
only to face them in a court system that ignores, if not
actually sanctioning, this abusive pattern of behavior.

This may be why many battered women drop dissolution

proceedings and return to a violent relationship.

They may

perceive themselves as being able to exert more control over

the situation by returning than they are able to do in a
court of law in which the patriarchal mind set continues to
reward violent men for their endeavors.

The results of the present study appear to support
Chesler's (1986) assertion that a different standard is

applied to parental behavior of mothers and fathers.

A

woman that leaves a marital relationship without taking her

children with her is apparently treated differently by the
court system than is the father under similar circumstances.

This differential treatment may be due to the court system
perceiving the mother as deviant if she leaves without her

children.

In the present study, in only two out of 13 cases

when the woman originally left home without her children,
was she eventually able to later get awarded primary
physical custody.

In one instance, the court initially gave custody to
the father.

Five years later, custody of the 16 year old

daughter was changed to the mother at the daughter's
request.

The daughter had alleged that the father had been

taking her earnings and some of her jewelry.

At this point,

the father began proceedings to gain custody of his other

two children, a 15 year old daughter and a 14 year old son.
Proceedings went off calendar and were never pursued.
The other case involved a mother that left the home

without her two children (six year old daughter and three
year old son) and was initially awarded joint physical

custody.

When the husband learned that she was living in a

lesbian relationship, he went back into court and asked for

sole physical custody and was granted this.

The mother went

into court several times over the next five years, concerned
about the father maltreating the children, to no avail.

Eventually, after psychological evaluations of the father,

mother, children, and the mother's partner (the father was
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remarried, but the new spouse was not required to undergo
evaluation), several incidents of documented abuse to the

children, several statements by the children's neighbors,
teachers, etc., and a suicide attempt by the daughter, the

court awarded the mother primary physical custody.
In contrast, of the fathers that were granted custody,

18 of them did not maintain physical custody of the children

initially when the couples separated.

Instead, they were

later granted physical custody.
Therefore, these facts reveal that it is much more

difficult for a mother to be granted physical custody of her
children if she does not maintain physical custody of her

children at the time the couple separates.

This can be very

devastating to a woman who has had to flee the home for fear

of her life, unable to take the children with her.

Upon

finding refuge, she then goes to court in order to get
protection orders as well as custody orders for the children
and finds that because she left the home without them, the
court interprets this as a lack of her interest in the
children.

In some instances, a woman is not able to take

the children because the man threatens to kill her if she

takes them or he may physically hold them from her.
Chesler (1986, p. 86) referred to the disparity in our

society's definitions of a "good enough" mother and a "good
enough" father.

A mother who leaves a relationship without

her children for whatever reasons is perceived as deviant
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and unfit, wher^^

a father that leases a relationship

without his children and later comes in to fight for custody
is seen by the court system as credible.

A "good enough"

father spends a great deal less time with his children and

is not able or agreeable to do what is expected physically
of a "good enough" mother to maintain family life.

Even a

father who beats his wife and withholds child support is
apparently as likely to be seen as a "good enough" father
and still has a 50/50 chance of winning custody.
Rather than just looking at each of the results

independently, it is of greater value to maintain a Gestalt

perspective of the findings that emerged from the present
study.

Although he may not always be successful, the

results indicate that a man with a violent history is
demonstrating a consistent pattern of attempting to maintain
control and to dominate his spouse after separation.

He is

more likely to fight for custody of his children than a
nonviolent father.

It could also be interpreted that a

violent father prefers to spend his money on attorney's fees
by initiating court appearances rather than pay court-

ordered child support to his ex-spouse.

It is also

important to consider the fact that the male who is

persistent is receiving intermittent reinforcement for his

actions.

He is successfully harassing his ex-wife by

keeping her tied up in court hearings and draining her
financially and psycholpgically.
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She is unable to focus on

healing herself or working with her children on the

unresolved issues of their violent history.

She is also not

receiving the court-ordered support that would help to get
her on her feet and she is making substantially less income

to suppprt her family than she was previously when living
with her spouse.

It is no wonder that women and children

have a difficult adjustment time after a marital separation.
In contrast, a father with a violent history can leave

the relationship without his children, fail to support them
after he leaves, and yet pursue custody in court, and he is

still as likely as a nonviolent father that is paying courtordered support to be granted custody of his children.

What

comes forth from the results of the study is the perpetual

existence of a problem of equity.

A mother's character is

much more strongly scrutinized by a court of law than is a
father's.

The courts need to recognize these issues of

control and acknowledge that the welfare of the children is

not the primary concern of violent fathers persisting in
custodial disputes.
Conclusions

;

It is my conclusion from the results of the present
study that the cycle of violence does not end when the

abused woman leaves the relationship.

Instead, it is merely

moved to a new setting with different methods of violence

employed.

By applying Mack's (1989) revision of Deschner's

(1984) cycle of violence, one can observe a patternof
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violence with dpinestically yioient fat^^
custody.

fighting for

Custody battles against battered women are merely

a variation of the chronic violence they have endured during
the relationship.

After the primitive rage, the woman leaves the abuser.

This ignites feelings of rejection and abandonment within
him which fuels his anger and moves him to strike out at his

spouse who has left him.

If he has the financial resources,

he seeks consolation by exploiting the court system.

He

thereby institutes a custody battle in order to strike fear

into the abused partner, hoping to regain his control.
As Goode (1971) proposed, the batterer utilizes the

major sets of resources available to him to induce the
spouse to return.

By withholding of economic rewards

(child/spousal support) and the threat of force (a custody
battle), he hopes to effectively regain his control over the
spouse.

■

As maintained by Goode (1971), chronic violence tends

to wear victims to the point in which they will do anything
to appease the batterer and avoid further violence.

Battered women, custodially embattled, are worn down

psychologically and financially by the batterer.

Some women

may return to the relationship at some point in order to

appease the abuser and stop the violence.

Other women may

forfeit property and other assets to the abuser as a way to
negotiate maintaining custody.
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In addition, some battered

women may sacrifice full custody and agree to joint custody
hoping to assuage the abuser's violence.

Seeing her wear down, along with reinforceraent from the
court system, the abuser is rewarded, not only by the gain

in power and control, but self-esteem as well.

Maintaining

control increases his sense of power and self-worth.

The abuser is also rewarded by revenge.

He perceives

his masculinity and self-worth threatened by his loss of
power and abandonment by his spouse and children.

The

abuser therefore seeks and realizes revenge against his
spouse through the court.
The court system needs to be more aware of the issues

of control in relationships involving a history of domestic
violence and consider the reasons violent fathers are

persisting in custodial battles rather than giving these men
intermittent reinforcement for their behavior.

To what

degree does the court system encourage battered women to

return to a violent relationship and also discourage other
women from leaving, knowing they will relinquish all control
to a court system that is unsympathetic and ignorant of the

underlying need of the abuser to be dominant, camouflaged by
a growing sentiment of presumption/preference in custodial
decision?

.

Judges and court mediators need more extensive training
in the area of domestic violence with emphasis on the

underlying issue of control.

By applying the cycle of
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violence to violent men custodially challenging their wives,
and training those involved in family lav, the true motives

of violent fathers would be more apparent.

In addition, the

courts would cease viewing the mother's concerns as lack of

cooperation.

By enlightening all involved, the courts would

benefit by a reduction in caseload.

Women and children

would benefit by escaping the cycle of violence and could
work toward healing themselves.
Suggestions for Future Research

Although the current study was able to establish a

pattern of domestic violence and paternal custodial

disputes,, it was based solely on information gathered from

dissolution of marriage files.

Important pieces of the

puzzle are sometimes left out of court files.

Such

information might consist of results of a family mediation
meeting, results of psychological evaluations, or various

coercive techniques the abuser may employ to force his
spouse to settle for less than she initially planned.

Therefore, further studies based on first-person interviews

of couples custodially embattled could include this valuable
information.

The courts nqw consider child support and custody

separate issues.

They do so in order to protect the rights

of low-income parents and to avoid the possibility of the
custodial parent holding the child for ransom.
Unfortunately, by separating these issues, the courts remain
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ignorant of the tactic of withholding support that is
employed by abusive men in order to control an ex-spouse.

One couid truly fill in a great deal of the missing
pieces by inGbrporating the information taken from
dissolution of marriage files with what is gathered from

first-person interviews.

Future studies could randomly

choose dissolution of marriage files, extract the

information available and also interview both parties to get
a much clearer picture of the dynamics involved.
It is ironic that family court mediators often have

available to them information on violence in the family.

Yet they may lack the expertise or interest to identify the
underlying issues of control that are at the heart of the

myriad of disputed issues when domestic violence is
involved.

Training of family court mediators on the

dynamics of domestic violence would be valuable to the

family court system by enhancing their ability to deal
effective with these complex and frustrating cases.
An additional suggestion for future research would be

to investigate the serendipitous finding that all of the

high income males in this randomly selected sample were

violent fathers fighting for custody.

Obviously this

suggest a systematic syndrome and it would be of great
interest and benefit to the literature to determine what
dynamics are at work.
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